GATT and the Emergence of the World Trade Organisation by Bhattacharya, Debesh
GATT and the Emergence of 
the World Trade Organisation 
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I met Soumyen Mukherjee in Sydney in 1971 for the first time during 
the Vietnam Moratorium days. I was impressed by his radical humanism, 
his concern for oppressed people everywhere particularly in India, and 
his search for the correct way of understanding historical materialism. 
I was very pleased to have a fellow Bengali to teach history at the 
University of Sydney. I talked to him a lot during the days he was 
the Director for the Centre for Indian Studies. I am convinced that here 
is a scholar who stands for non-racism, non-alignment and anti-
imperialism. Soumyen has become a trusted friend who will never let 
his friends down and who is truly international in outlook. Narrow 
domestic and sectarian approaches to history outrage him and he is 
prepared to denounce them in the strongest possible manner. He does 
not listen to fools easily and is prepared to fight against the Bharatiya 
Janata Party. I sincerely hope that this paper will stimulate his approach 
towards international trade and development issues. 
The central purpose of this paper is to present an overview of the 
General Agreement for Tariff and Trade (GATT) and its role in 
developing countries (DCG) during the last four decades. The results 
of earlier GATT rounds of agreements will be analysed in Section 1. 
The Umguay Round of multilateral trade negotiation (MTN) which 
began in 1986 and concluded on 15 December 1993 will be critically 
examined in Section 2. The key agreements in Safeguards, Textile and 
Clothing, Agriculture, Anti-Dumping, Subsidies and trade-related 
investment will also be examined in this Section 2. Section 3 will 
examine the main features of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
whose main functions are expected to facilitate the implementation, 
administration and operation of the Umguay Round of Agreements 
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(URA). The WTO aims at revising the rules of trade liberalisation of 
international economic relations so as to provide more equal 
opportunities to all countries. My policy recommendations and 
conclusions are also explained in Section 3. 
1 
Developing countries (DCG) have been arguing that the existing 
international order is an exploitative world order. It has resulted in the 
concentration of economic power in the hands of a few developed 
countries (DC), which lay down the rules of international trade, the 
monetary system, finance and decision-making arrangements. 
Consequently DCG are economically as dominated today as they were 
under direct colonial rule. It is not surprising, then, that the existing 
order of global capitalism has failed to solve the basic problems of 
developing countries-acute poverty, unemployment and 
underemployment, and low physical quality of life. 
The first GATT MTN came from the meeting held in Geneva (1947), 
the second in Annecy (1949), the third in Torquay (1951), the fourth 
again in Geneva (1956), the Dillon Rounds of Agreement (196~61), 
the Kennedy (1964-67) and the Tokyo Round in the 1970s. In each 
previous round of agreement, GATT was largely irrelevant to the 
problems of DGC in the 1990s and did not bring about any significant 
advantages to them. 
DCG did not achieve much from the Tokyo round of trade 
negotiations. In the circumstances, most DGC have been continually 
suffering from their balance of payments crisis and hence they have 
not been able to achieve self-reliance. Self-reliance means that any 
country's requirements should be met from within to the maximum 
possible extent, since self-reliance and a persistent balance of payments 
gap cannot go together. From a favourable balance of trade position in 
1950, the non-oil exporting (NOE) DCG now invariably suffer from 
deficits in the balance of payments on current account for all these 
countries during the years 1973-88. The aggregate current deficit of 
NOEDCG increased from $11.6 billion in 1973 to $109 billion in 1981 
and to $45 billion in 1985, and to $15.3 billion in 1988. In the 1990s it 
has exploded again, increasing from $47.2 billion in 1994 to $65.7 
billion in 1995 and finally projected to $72.6 billion in 1996 (World 
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Economic Outlook, May 1995, p.156). For example, DCG exported 
$1231.2 billion in 1995 which is less than their import payment to the 
rest of the world, i.e $1274.9 billion. 
There is a marked asymmetry between the relative shares of the 
different groups of countries in the total trade flows of each of them. 
International trade is primarily a North-North affair. Even the DCG trade 
more with the oc than among themselves. It reflects the persistence of 
colonial trade and finance relationships even though most DCG have 
achieved political independence. The relative absence of significant 
horizontal trade links between DCG (although growing very slowly over 
the last three decades) cannot be explained purely in terms of any 
economic theory. The comparative advantage trade theory cannot 
explain the limited participation of the Transition (formerly the Soviet 
Union) and of DCG in the international division of labour. Neither is 
there much evidence of the factor-price equalisation even after four 
centuries of trading between the DCG and DC . Table 1 shows the share 
of major groups of countries in World Exports before the beginning of 
the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. 
Table 1: Share of Major Groups of Countries In World Exports (Percentage) 
1950 1960 1970 1975 1978 1979 1980 1985 
North 61.1 66.8 71.3 66.0 67.0 65.2 63.1 65.5 
South 30.8 21.7 18.0 24.2 23.3 25.6 28.1 24.0 
Non-oil South 23.6 14.2 11.3 10.1 11.0 11.1 11.2 14.0 
Transition States 8.1 11.7 10.6 9.7 9.2 8.9 10.5 
Sources: IMF Survey, July 16, 1984. p. 221, July 28, 1986, p.238 and UNCTAD Handbook of 
International Trade and Development Statistics, 1981, p.25. 1986. Handbook gives us lhe 1985 
figures as reported in lhe UNCTAD Bulletin, No. 230, March 1987, p.9. The North refers to all DC 
and the Soulh refers to all DGC. Figures are from IMF Survey, July 27, 1987 and lhcy represent 
allDCG. 
Myrdal1 provided his theory of cumulative causation to argue 
that advantages are cumulative, so that any initial competitive edge 
results in further increases in efficiency and hence to a cumulatively 
greater advantage. On the other hand, if countries start from an 
initial disadvantageous position, they tend to suffer cumulatively. 
Consequently if countries start from a position of inequality due to 
unequal bargaining strength, one can explain the present trade 
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imbalances between DGC and DC. The colonial past is mainly 
responsible for the current international division of labour and 
international exchange relations. DGC mainly export primary 
commodities, raw materials, and minerals, which are processed in DC. 
The former are also markets for manufactured products and also places 
for the capital investments of the latter. DGC (importing goods which 
have been processed from their own raw materials) have to pay not 
only for the cost of processing but also for the profits earned and costs 
of transportation both ways. 
The consequences of balance of payments crisis for most NOEDGC 
would require significant restraint in monetary, fiscal and exchange rate 
adjustments in these countries. As World Economic Outlook2 points 
out, the median rate of monetary expansion in these countries declined 
substantially in the 1980s. Most governments have also started reducing 
their expenditures, with continued emphasis on reducing social wage 
(reducing subsidies on essential items like food, medicine, education, 
health and other welfare services). Poor people in most indebted 
counuies like Mexico, Brazil, Peru, Ghana, Zambia and the Philippines 
were suffering extra hardships because of these reduced subsidies. 
Moreover, any consequent reduction in government activities in 
NOEDGC invariably aggravate the already acute un- and under-
employment problems in these countries. 
In my Political Economy of Development,3 it was shown that the 
purchasing power of DGC's traditional export products--coffee, cocoa, 
tea, soya beans, cotton, jute, natural rubber, and copper-is only a third 
or a fourth of goods and services imported from DC during the last 
four decades. With declining real prices of the principal primary 
commodities exported by DGC during the last four decades, these 
countries were compelled to export greater quantities of their 
commodities in order to be able to import essentially needed industrial 
machinery and intermediate goods. As Castro4 points out, in 1960 it 
took 200 tons of sugar to buy a 180-hp bu11dozer, while in 1984 it took 
800 tons of sugar at the world market price to buy a similar bulldozer. 
Similarly, in 1960, 37.3 tons of fertilisers could be bought for a ton of 
coffee. In 1982 only 15.8 tons of fertilisers could be bought for a ton 
of coffee. 
It is a great pity that no previous GATT negotiation called for 
agreements towards a link between the prices of DGC's commodity 
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exports and the prices they have to pay for essential imports from 
DC if they were to diversify their economies. Such a link would 
have stabilised the amounts of foreign exchange earnings of the 
NOEDGC and would also overcome the fundamental problems of 
persistent deficits in their balance of payments. 
When DGC do manage to produce manufactured goods like 
textiles or shoes, their exports are usually confronted by quotas, 
tariff barriers and other restrictions. The protectionist policies of DC, 
plus the dumping and unfair competition with subsidised products 
which those same countries habitually employ in international trade, 
are the major obstacles to expansion and diversification of DGC. 
The case for preferential trade treatment in the form of a system of 
Preferences (GSP) is presented by Nowzad.5 The object was to 
bind the preferential GSP tariff rates and to establish a 'built-in-
differentiator' so that DGC may get compensation for any erosion of 
the GSP from general tariff reductions under the MTN. Imports from 
DGC were supposed to be totally exempt from 'safeguard action' (i.e., 
DC's authority to improve import restrictions to protect their domestic 
producers from injury) or at the least, much more stringent criteria be 
applied before 'safeguard' measures could be taken against such 
imports. DGC should have been able to keep both the GSP and 
MFN tariff preferential treatment. 
Average MFN tariff rates in Table 2 on clothing in Canada, Austria 
and the USA ranged from 20 to 50 per cent, but they averaged 93 per 
cent in New Zealand. Tariffs on footwear stood at about 14 per cent in 
Japan. The MFN tariffs for these products were 40 per cent or more 
during the 1980s in Australia and New Zealand. On average, DC 
now impose tariffs on industrial imports from DGC from 2.1 per cent 
on raw materials, 5.4 per cent on semi-manufactures and 9.1 per cent 
on finished products. As Balassa6 correctly points out, the existing 
tariff structure in effect discriminates against higher levels of processing 
and production, thus encouraging DGC to produce and export only 
primary products. For example, the applied tariff rate in Australia on 
raw sugar is 0.1 per cent while it increases to 16.4 per cent if it was 
imported in the form of refined sugar. 
A reduction in tariffs alone is unlikely to have any great effect on 
the exports of manufactures of DGC so long as NTB and other 
forms of quantitative restrictions to trade remain. NTB have been 
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Table 2: Post-Tokyo MFN, Applied, and GSP Tariffs in Selected Developed Countries 
New United All 
Product Group Auslralia Austria Canada EEC Finland Japan Norway Zealand Sweden Switzer- States Developed 
land Countries 
Average MFN Tariff Rates 
All Food Items 4.9 8.0 6.2 3.7 8.9 9.7 2.8 9.7 1.6 10.0 4.1 6.4 t::! 
Food and live animals 2.8 5.9 6.8 3.2 9.3 10.0 3.0 5.7 1.4 9.0 3.8 6. ~ o-
~ 
Oilseeds and nuts 4.1 1.9 6.0 10.3 7.9 5.6 4.5 0.9 3.3 7.5 1.4 5.3 "' ;::,-
Animal and vegetable oils 2.0 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.9 0.1 tx:l 
w ;::,-
():> Agricultural Raw Materials 5.1 2.3 0.6 3.4 l.l 0.7 0.6 1.0 1.7 1.9 0.3 0.8 ~ 
..... 
Ores and Metals 10.2 5.6 2.1 2.8 1.9 2.5 1.5 6.0 2.5 1.4 1.9 2.3 ~ (") 
Iron and steel 17.2 8.4 5.4 5.5 3.9 5.0 1.8 8.8 4.8 2.0 4.3 5.1 ;::,-~ 
Nonferrous metals 3.9 6.1 2.2 3.2 1.2 5.5 1.9 4.0 1.0 1.2 0.7 2.3 ~ 
~ 
Fuels 0.0 2.1 1.4 0.1 0.1 1.5 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.1 
Chemicals 5.4 6.3 6.4 8.4 2.4 5.5 5.9 6.7 5.0 0.9 3.7 5.8 
Manufactures excl. chemicals 17.7 14.1 7.0 8.1 8.2 5.7 6.1 22.6 5.4 3.3 5.6 7.0 
Leather 17.8 5.3 3.8 10.2 ll.8 11.9 4.7 20.9 4.1 1.8 4.2 5.1 
Textile yarn and fabrics 15.3 18.2 9.4 17.3 22.7 8.6 12.8 16.2 10.6 6.0 10.6 11.7 
Clothing 4'l.3 30.2 12.6 19.9 32.0 15.0 20.3 93.0 13.6 8.6 20.3 17.5 
Footwear 43.9 25.9 11.9 22.5 16.0 14.2 1!.2 40.3 14.3 9.6 11.7 13.4 
Other Items 0.2 3.3 0.1 4.8 L3 2.3 2.0 1.2 1.8 0.4 
........... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Table 2 cont'd: 
----- §2 
New United All ~ 
Product Group Australia Austria Canada EEC Finland Japan Norway Zealand Sweden Switzer- States Developed ~ 
land Countries ;:s ~ 
..... 
;:l"' 
Average Applied Tariff Rates ~ ~ 
All Food Items items 3.1 6.8 3.0 4.4 5.2 9.4 1.4 7.8 0.8 9.1 3.5 5.3 
;:! 
~ 
Food and live animals 1.7 4.9 2.9 4.8 5.7 9.7 1.5 3.9 0.8 8.4 3.2 5.3 ~ ~ 
Oilseeds and nuts 2.0 1.5 4.6 4.9 5.5 4.8 4.3 0.7 2.2 7.4 1.0 4.0 ;:s 2 
Animals and vegetable oils 2.4 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.0 0.2 
.Q, 
t.<J Agricultural Raw Materials 0.7 1.6 3.7 0.4 1.0 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.4 0.7 0.3 0.5 ..... 
cs:> ;:l"' 
Ores and Metals 4.3 0.3 2.7 0.7 0.1 1.8 0.4 4.2 0.2 0.1 2.2 1.5 ~ 
Iron and steel 7.3 0.5 5.6 2.3 0.1 2.9 0.7 6.4 0.4 0.1 5.0 3.4 ~ 
Nonferrous metals 2.4 0.2 2.8 0.5 0.0 4.3 0.1 2.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 1.3 ;::!.. R. 
Fuel~ 0.0 1.5 0.2 0.3 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 ~ Chemicals 4.0 0.5 3.0 3.4 0.1 4.8 0.4 4.9 0.4 0.1 3.9 3.1 
Manufactures excl. chemicals 11.5 2.0 6.2 4.6 1.3 4.6 1.3 18.3 1.4 0.4 4.9 4.7 ~ ~ 
Leather 10.9 0.9 11.0 2.1 2.3 10.7 0.8 21.4 0.3 0.1 2.7 3.1 a 
Textile yarn and fabric 11.3 2.0 18.3 5.3 1.0 7.1 1.6 10.9 1.7 0.6 12.1 7.9 ~ ~ 
Clothing 35.6 5.1 17.2 7.3 7.7 10.0 3.0 75.6 4.8 1.7 18.1 11.9 ;:s &,;· 
Footwear 27.9 1.2 23.4 6.5 3.8 12.5 2.4 28.4 2.8 0.6 9.5 9.0 ~ 
..... 
Other Items 0.1 1.1 4.7 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.4 0.9 0.1 0.2 3.6 3.3 
.... 
0 ;:s 
All Products 8.3 2.0 4.4 2.5 1.0 3.1 1.0 11.0 0.8 1.0 3.4 3.0 
................................................. ······ ....................................... 
Table 2 cont'd: 
New United All 
Product Group Austtalia Austtia Canada EEC Finland Japan Norway Zealand Sweden Switzer- States Developed 
land Countries 
Average Tariff for GSP Beneficiaries 
All Food Items items 1.3 9.0 1.5 5.0 7.0 11.1 0.3 6.2 0.4 6.3 3.6 5.5 
Food and live animals 1.0 8.9 1.3 5.1 7.2 11.7 0.3 0.8 0.4 6.5 3.4 5.6 . t::1 
Oilseeds and nuts 0.7 0.1 5.6 6.2 8.8 5.0 3.2 0.0 1.7 9.0 
(I) 
0.3 4.5 0" (I) 
Animals and vegetable oils 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 10.7 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 Cll ~ 
Agricultural Raw Materials 0.1 1.4 3.1 0.5 5.5 .0.5 0.5 0.0 2.1 0.3 0.1 0.5 tx;, 
"" 
Ores and Metals 1.6 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.1 1.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.4 1.1 0.9 ~ 0 ~ 
Iron and steel 4.9 2.9 4.0 3.3 0.4 2.0 0.4 2.3 1.0 0.4 3.5 3.0 
.... 
~ 
Nonferrous metals 0.3 1.1 0.9 0.5 0.0 3.1 1.7 0.5 0.1 0.9 0.3 1.1 o· ~ 
Fuels 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.6 ~ 
Chemicals 4.2 4.0 6.1 4.1 0.1 5.1 0.2 1.1 0.6 0.4 1.0 3.7 ~ 
Manufactures excl. chemicals 11.4 18.9 13.8 6.4 9.3 4.2 5.9 14.3 6.9 2.7 6.6 6.7 
Leather 9.6 6.6 9.6 2.8 6.1 8.4 5.5 18.0 1.2 1.1 1.4 3.2 
Textile yam and fabric 6.3 17.5 19.8 7.6 6.0 6.1 11.0 8.5 6.8 2.7 9.0 8.4 
Clothing 35.1 27.2 16.2 9.3 23.6 8.6 18.9 82.8 13.2 7.6 17.8 14.6 
Footwear 25.6 24.4 23.3 9.1 14.8 7.9 11.6 22.1 13.4 4.4 9.4 10 
Other Items 0.0 5.2 5.6 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.1 1.7 0.0 0.4 0.4 3.8 
All Products 4.3 4.9 4.4 2.1 4.6 2.3 2.8 3.3 2.3 2.3 3.6 2.7 
Source: Calculations on ihe basis of tlJc GATT Tariff Study and UNC'T AD Series D Trade Tapes. Sec Laird and Yeats (1987). 
Table 3: Analysis of the Escalation in Post-Tokyo Round Applied Tariffs in Selected Developed Countries ~ Product Group Australia Austria EEC Finland Japan Norway New Sweden Switzerland United ~ 
Zealand States ;:s 
R.. 
..... ;::.-
Meat products ~ 
~ Fresh and frozen meat 0.0 0.2 6.6 0.0 10.1 8.3 4.3 0.0 4.2 1.6 ~ 
Prepared meat 4.6 2.6 17.9 12.6 22.5 8.1 7.0 0.0 5.2 2.3 ~ ~ 
Fish 
"' ;:s 
Fresh and frozen fish 0.0 3.7 6.3 0.8 5.3 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.4 0.5 ~ 
"'" 
Fish preparations 0.9 7.2 12.4 1.2 10.7 1.6 1.2 0.1 1.4 1.1 ~ 
..... 
Vegetables ;::.-~ 
Fresh vegetables 3.4 2.1 6.7 14.0 9.0 3.4 0.1 5.1 4.9 7.6 ~ 
Vegetable preparations 9.8 13.3 15.1 14.6 17.5 6.6 5.7 6.2 11.4 11.0 S: Fruit ~ Fresh fruit 0.2 3.1 7.7 10.7 21.5 1.0 0.0 0.6 7.4 1.1 
Prepared fruit 6.3 17.3 16.6 8.5 21.8 3.1 11.1 0.7 13.7 20.3 ~ 
Coffee 0 ~ Green or roasted beans 0.0 14.3 3.8 3.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 8.5 0.0 ~ 
Coffee extracts 0.5 3.5 13.8 0.0 17.4 0.2 31.1 0.0 6.0 0.0 
;:s 
~· 
Vegetable oils ~ .... s· 
Vegetable oilseed 2.1 0.5 0.0 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.0 ;:s 
Vegetable oils 3.1 l.l 6.1 9.3 6.2 4.5 0.0 1.0 8.2 0.7 
............................................................................................................................................................................................ 
Table 3 cont'd: 
Product Group Australia Austtia EEC Finland Japan Norway New Sweden Switzerland Uniled 
Zealand States 
Sugar 
Raw sugar 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 3.6 0.0 0.0 42.3 0.6 
Refmed sugar 16.4 0.0 0.0 16,9 82.5 2.7 0.7 1.1 34.1 9.9 ~ 
Chocolate 0" ~ 
Cocoa beans 0.0 5.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1'1.1 ;:,-
Powder and butter 0.0 5,6 9.0 0.0 2.9 0.0 7.6 0.3 0.3 0.1 tx:l 
~ ~ 
"' 
Chocolate 9.3 0.6 0.1 0.1 24.3 0.1 27.1 0.2 14.3 0.1 ..... 
Tobacco a-(") 
Raw tobacco 9.1 9.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.6 0.0 0.0 8.8 ~ 
Tobacco products 16.6 211.3 61.8 2.1 82.1 5.1 31.6 1.9 17.6 9.1 ~ ~ 
Rubber 
Natural rubber 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Unvu1canized rubber 12.2 0.5 2.2 0.2 5.5 0.5 12.0 0.8 0.1 6.4 
Rubber product~ 20.0 2.0 5.5 4.1 12.4 3.1 28.3 2.9 1.0 9.2 
Wood 
Rough wood 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Shaped wood 1.5 1.1 0.1 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 o_o 0.1 0.1 
Wood manufactured 14.5 1.2 4_2 0.1 1.2 02 11.2 0.6 0.4 4.7 
............................................................................................................................................ 
Table 3 cont'd: 
S2 
Product Group Australia Austria EEC Finland Japan Norway New Sweden Swit7.erland United ~ 




Pulpwood 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.5 0.0 0.8 00 
"" 
Paper and board 5.7 1.8 2.3 0.2 5.7 0.0 5.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 ~ ~ 
Paper manufactures 11.6 5.1 6.0 0.6 3.6 0.1 25.3 0.3 0.3 3.8 (I) aa 
Wool 
"" ;:s 
Not carded or combed 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 5.2 (") 
"" Carded or combed 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.1 ~ ~ ..... 
"" 
Wool yarn 3.4 0.0 1.4 0.0 3.9 0.1 19.7 0.0 0.0 12.9 ;::r-
"" Wool fabrics 25.6 0.1 2.7 0.0 11.0 0.2 33.4 0.2 0.0 37.3 ~ Cotton ;::!.. 
Not carded or combed 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 Q.. 
Carded or combed 30.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 5.0 ~ Q 
Cotton yarn 13.9 2.6 2.3 0.8 3.8 2.3 1.3 2.6 1.2 8.7 Q.. 
"" Cotton fabrics 2.4 3.2 5.6 1.4 5.9 4.0 1.3 3.6 0.7 10.4 0 
Jute ~ Q 
Raw jute 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ;:s 1;;" 
Jute yarn or cordage 8.9 0.8 2.0 0.7 5.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 1.3 Q .... 
Jute fabric 0.0 2.9 4.8 0.1 5.4 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.4 0.0 s· ;:s 
Jute bags 1.9 10.9 4.7 1.7 5.5 0.3 1.4 1.0 0.5 1.0 
............................................................................................. ,. ................... ······ ..... 
·············· 
Table 3 cont'd: 
--
Product Group Australia Austtia EEC Fmland Japan Norway New Sweden Switzerland United 
Zealand States 
Sisal 
Sisal fibres 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 
Cordage 8.3 1.0 4.3 2.1 3.4 0.9 17.4 0.8 0.2 0.3 
Metal Ores 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 ~ 
Iron o-~ (I> 
Iron bars and ingots 0.0 0.1 2.3 0.1 3.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 ~ 






S" Unwrought copper 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 ~ 
~ 
Ref"med copper 5.2 0.1 1.8 0.1 5.9 0.0 2.2 0.2 0.1 1.8 (:l 
Aluminium ~ 
Unwrought aluminium 2.0 0.3 0.8 0.0 6.6 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.6 
Refmed aluminium 4.3 0.2 2.1 0.0 9.0 0.3 7.0 0.4 0.1 3.2 
Lead 
Unwrougbt lead 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.1 3.5 
Refined lead 0.4 0.0 5.8 0.0 6.8 0.0 6.4 0.0 0.0 1.6 
Zinc 
Unwrougbt zinc 4.1 0.1 0.9 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 
Refmedzinc 2.8 0.6 4.1 0.0 6.6 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 2.3 
............•................. ····-······························ ·······-· .............. . .................... ············· ........... . ..................... 
Table 3 cont'd: 
Product Group Austtalia Austria EEC Fmland Japan Naway New Sweden .Switzerland United ~ 




Phospllate (I) ~ 
Natural pbospllates 0.0 6.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 ~ 
Phosporic acid 19.0 0.0 6.1 0.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 
(I) 
1.7 oa 
Superpbosphates 0.0 1.3 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Cl> ;::! 
Petroleum ~ 
"" 
Crude petroleum 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 .g, 
.... 
c.n Refmed petroleum 0.0 1.6 1.0 0.0 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 ;:l" (I) 
Memo items ~ 
Percentage of chains ;:!.. 
in which escalation occurs 88.0 88.0 96.0 68.0 96.0 68.0 76.0 68.0 96.0 
R. 
88.0 ~ Average tariff differeence 
from primary to f} 
processed stage 6.9 9.5 6.7 1.9 12.5 1.0 9.7 0.7 1.8 4.7 0 oa ~ 
;::! 





used by DC as the most-effective instrument for the prevention of 
industrialisation in DGC and they include an infinite number of 
protectionist practices-UNCTAD has documented some 700 of such 
practices-which range from government subsidies, quantitative 
restrictions, health standards and technical standards to deliberately 
complex procedures. Morton7 has stated that in 1969 DC imposed 
NTB measures on 28 per cent of all imports from DGC, as compared 
with 11 per cent on imports from other DC. In 1984, 21 per cent of 
imports from DGC were subject to NTB in DC, as compared with 
only 11 per cent of imports from other DC. In addition, some 29 per 
cent of the agricultural exports of DGC were subject to NTB in DC. 
Agricultural products still suffer NTB measures for 33 per cent of 
value from DGC, textiles 62 per cent and steel 46 per cent. Further 
NTB are high on food and agricultural product, cotton textile, iron 
and steel, while they are relatively low on raw materials and fuels 
and hence once again discriminate against the levels of processing 
in DGC. 
Table 4: Fifteen DC NTB on Imports from DC and DGC, 1984 
Percentage covered by NTB 
Value oflmports Number of Categories 
from from 
Product Categories DC DGC DC DGC 
All 17 19 II 21 
Agricultural 44 33 42 35 
Fuels and ores 8 10 13 11 
Industrial 14 21 7 18 
Textiles 25 62 20 58 
Steel 50 46 21 21 
Footwear 2 4 14 14 
Electrical 10 7 5 8 
Vehicles 30 3 6 10 
Source: Finger and Olcchowski. 
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The European Union, Japan and the USA imposed NTB measures 
in the following Table 5 between 1988 and 1993. 
Table 5: NTB Measures 1988 and 1993 (Per cents of Imports covered) 
1988 1993 
CoreNTB 14.6 14.0 
Quantitative restrictions 12.1 9.8 
Export restraints 8.0 6.6 
Anti-dumping, countervailing 2.4 3.7 
Other price measures 1.6 1.6 
Source: IMF International Trade Policies, The Uruguay Round and Beyond, Vol.l Principal 
Issues, 1994, p.8. 
The potential for an expansion of DGC exports to DC exists, 
and discriminating barriers against the exports from these countries 
should be reduced if that potential is to be realised. If DC 
were completely to dismantle their trade barriers against the 
manufactured goods of DGC, the latter could earn many billion dollars 
per year. If the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations leads to a tariff 
reduction of 50 per cent, this would add many billion dollars to DGC 
manufactured exports by 1995. The non-tariff trade barriers of 
developed countries could be partially relaxed. This could add 
many billion dollars per year to those earnings. The IMP recently 
estimated annual real income gains globally ranging from $212 
to $274 billion (or about 1 per cent of world GDP) upon full 
implementation of the Uruguay Round, of which some $80 billion would 
accrue to poor countries. 
2 
The URA began in Uruguay in 1986. This time DGC wanted to 
negotiate meaningfully for trade liberalisation. They wanted to get 
rid of protectionism sanctioned by earlier rounds of GAIT. GAIT's 
Article XIX allowed members to escape their normal GAIT obligations 
and erect trade barriers to safeguard any of their producers seriously 
injured by the liberalisation of trade. However, most governments 
tend to ignore other important clauses of this Article which provides 
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that foreign suppliers may retaliate or be compensated for losses 
from the denial of market access. Tables 5 and 5(a) show coverage 
of Article XIX Action between 1950 and 1993 (situation as of 15 
April 1993). 
Discrimination against cotton textiles was incorporated into the 
short term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton-Textile 
in the early 1960s. This be~ame in 1974 a long term Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement (MFA) was followed by MFA II (1978-81). MFA III 
(1982-86), and MFA IV (1986-1994); the current MFA now covers 
almost all textile and clothing products and has subjected nearly 40 
poor countries to export restraints in most DC. This discrimination 
principle has been regularly extended in its product and country 
coverage against DGC. These measures in the forms of selective 
restraint arrangements reflect when the exporting country, voluntarily 
or not, undertakes not to ship more than a certain amount of goods to 
the importing DC. These are usually known as Voluntary Export 
Restraints (VER) or Orderly Marketing Agreements (OME). Currently, 
there are over 200 such measures and the most frequent users are 
the USA and the European Economic Union. 
DC have increasingly used agricultural subsidies in recent years. 
Such subsidy programmes, originally motivated either by a desire 
for food security or to assist farmers needing support from their 
governments, have in many cases led to structural overcapacity. 
Indeed, many rich European countries which were previously 
major importers have now not only become self-sufficient in 
agriculture but have even become large-scale exporters of a number 
of products which they previously used to import from poor DGC. 
This has been the outcome of the European Community's Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) which was launched in 1962. Subsidies 
to the agricultural sector in DC have acted as barriers to the 
agricultural exports from DGC. Further the availability of cheap 
subsidised imports from rich countries inhibited domestic production 
of DG.Cs because of the lack of necessary incentives to cover the 
domestic cost and hence prevented the emergence of self-sufficiency 
for many food importing DGC. 
Table 6 shows agricultural producer subsidy equivalents for the 
period between 1979 and 1993. 
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Table 6: Agricultural Producer Subsidy Equivalents 
Annual Average (In Billions of US Dollars) 
1979-86 1990 1992 1993 
Australia 1.00 1.38 1.11 0.96 
European Union 82.11 82.79 79.57 39.61 
Japan 20.96 29.85 36.07 34.99 
USA 22.73 27.70 25.41 28.35 
Total OECD 167.44 168.29 163.12 97.88 
(In Per cent of Farm Gate Prices) 
1979-86 1990 1992 1993 
Australia 10 12 10 9 
European Union 46 47 48 37 
Japan 64 65 71 70 
USA 21 23 21 23 
Total OECD 34 42 41 42 
Source: IMF, ibUi. p.9. 
It is necessary here to point out that the monopolisation of control 
over the international monetary system and financial arrangements 
is a feature of the continuation of external control over the South. The 
IMF and World Bank still reflect the politico-financial balance of 
the 1940s and 1950s and they have not kept up with the changes 
that have taken place in the world. One of the founders of these 
institutions, Keynes8 made the following statement: 'I conceive of the 
management and the effective voting power as being permanently 
Anglo-American.' 
Developed countries, Jed by the USA and the IMF have shown an 
inadequate appreciation of the problems of a deteriorating world 
environment causing underdevelopment in DGC. Only 5.2 per cent of 
the current account deficits of DGC during the period 1976-82 were 
assigned by the IMF for compensating for these deficits. The IMF has 
attached strings in many cases that entail a high social, economic and 
political price that go against the interests of DGC. As the Brandt 
Report9 has correctly observed: 
49 
Debesh Bhattacharya 
The IMF's insistence on drastic measures, often within the time 
framework of only one year, has tended to impose unnecessary and 
unacceptable political burden on the poorest, on occasion leading to 
'IMF riots' and even the downfall of governments. 
All three institutions, World Bank, IMF and GATT really looked 
after the interests of DC during the previous rounds of GATf. DGC 
were marginal players and their interests were never the primary focus 
ofsuchMTN. 
Table 7 shows the sector-wise UR tariff reduction together with DGC 
high export interest. It also shows that the biggest reductions, ranging 
from 69 to 60 per cent measured in terms of bound rates will be made 
in sectors (wood, paper, pulp, and furniture, metals, and non-electric 
machinery) where tariff level is already low. For textile, clothing, leather, 
and rubber, the reductions range from 22 to 18 per cent. 
Table 7: DC: Uruguay round Tariff Reductions by Sector (in per cent) 
Sector 





Chemicals, photographic supplies 
Fish products 
Transport equipment 
Textiles and clothing 
Leather, rubber 
Source: GATT (1994). 











Cameroon, Congo, Ghana, Indonesia, 
Paraguay 
Bolivia, Cameroon, Sierra Leone, Zaire, 
Zimbabwe 
Mali, Singapore 
Congo, S.Leone, Zaire, 
Zimbabwe 
Malaysia, Singapore 
Jamaica, Namibia, Niger 
Belize, Cuba, Ecuador, Honduras 
Bangladesh, Egypt, China, India, 
Morocco, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tunisia 
Kenya, Nigeria, Paraguay, Uruguay, 
Cambodia 
The post-URA tariff structure will still compel DGC to specialise in 
raw materials and discriminate against the levels of processing. 
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Table 8 shows Tariff Escalation on DC Imports from DGC. The URA 
would reduce all these tariff rates if they are implemented, but the then 
tariff structure will still discriminate against the higher levels of 
processing and value-added activities, 0.8 per cent on raw materials, 
2.8 per cent on semi-manufactures, and 6.2 per cent on finished 
products. 
Table 8: Tariff Escalation on DC Imports from DGC (in per cent) 
Share of Tariffs 
each stage 
Pre-URA Post-URA Percentage 
Reduction 
All Industrial Products (ex.Oil) 
Raw materials 22.0 2.1 0.8 62.0 
Semi-manufactures 21.0 5.3 2.8 47.0 
Finished products 57.0 9.1 6.2 32.0 
Total 100.0 6.8 4.3 37.0 
All tropical industrial products 
Raw materials 35.0 0.1 0.0 100.0 
Semi-manufactures 30.0 6.3 3.5 44.0 
Finished products 34.0 6.6 2.6 61.0 
Natural resource-based products 
Raw materials 11.0 3.1 2.0 35.0 
Semi-manuf.Jcturcs 40.0 3.5 2.0 43.0 
Finished products 17.0 7.9 5.9 25.0 
Total 100.0 4.0 2.7 33.0 
Source: GAIT (1994 b). 
Hence it is clear from the above table that following the URA, tariff 
bindings will actually increase; it will increase from 13 to 61 per cent 
of imports by DGC and from 74 to 96 per cent by transition economies. 
The URA is not reducing tariffs universally in the near future. Moreover 
all DGC are likely to lose their GSP. There is no trade-off for DGC for 
their inability to preserve preferential tariff margins. 10 
Two areas of world trade-intellectual property and services-are 
now within the fields of continuous MTN within the WTO. In the short 
run the enforcement of TRIP rnight create additional problems for DGC, 
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especially in the fields of life-saving medicines. The services agreement 
in the UR provides a multilateral framework on the principles of non-
discrimination and transparency. Foreign service suppliers will get 
market access and treatment no less favourable than that which applies 
to domestic supplies. Table 9 shows the extent of global tariff bindings 
agreed in the URA. 
Textiles and Clothing were going to be gradually integrated into 
the WTO/GATT in 1994 in a four-stage phase-out over ten years, under 
the supervision of a Textiles Monitoring Body. Products accounting 
for not less than 16 per cent of total volume of imports in terms of 
the stated Harmonised System lines or categories in 1990 were to be 
integrated into GATT 1994 upon entry into force of WTO. After 
the third year of the first phase out period, at least another 17 per cent 
of total 1990 import volumes of the listed products to be integrated, 
followed by at least 18 per cent after the seventh year, and the 
remainder 49 per cent at the end of the ten-year period. Each phase out 
must encompass products chosen by the restricting country from four 
groups-tops and yarns, fabrics, made-up textiles, and clothing. 
Outstanding quota restrictions will be expanded by the prevailing 
(bilaterally negotiated) quota growth rate plus 16 per cent annually 
in the first three years, by 25 per cent in the subsequent four years, 
and by 27 per cent in the final three years. Safeguards may be 
maintained for a maximum of three years phased out over their 
duration. 
The Uruguay Round on the Agreement on Safeguards has tried to 
confront the discriminatory use of Article XIX of GATT. It emphasises 
the importance of structural adjustment and the need to enhance rather 
than limit competition in international markets in 14 articles and an 
annex. Articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 10 establish basic principles, rules, 
conditions and scope for the application of the safeguard measures 
provided for in Article XIX. Article 4 defines the criteria of serious 
injury. Article 7 uses time-limits (initially for 4 years and the total life 
should not exceed 8 years for developed and 10 years for DGC) for the 
application of safeguard measures. Article 8 relates to the waiver on 
compensation requirements. Article 9 allows for preferential treatment 
for DGC. Article II prohibits and phases out these measures. Finally 
Articles 12, 13, and 14 state the procedures for monitoring and review 
of the operation of the Agreement and the requirements for notification, 
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consultation and dispute settlement. Recently the USA has been 
championing the use of voluntary import expansions (VIE) as a form 
of export protectionism. Under VIE, countries like Japan are induced, 
by incentives or penalties, to import specific amounts from the USA. 
For semiconductor chips, the USA wanted the commitment from Japan 
that the USA would supply 20 per cent of the Japanese market by some 
target date. In April1987 the USA imposed tariffs on $300 million worth 
of Japanese exports to punish Japan for nonfulfilment of its target. 
Further the USA has been pressing Japan to import more goods and 
services from the USA because of the latter's persistent surplus in 
balance of trade with Japan. 
The following results of the Uruguay Round Agreements 
effectively place all member countries at broadly comparable levels 
of obligation: 
(i) the strengthening of the existing rules to govern a variety of 
trade policy measures, particularly those are<..> which had consistently 
been sources of trade tensions and disputes; 
(ii) the achievement of significant degree of tariff liberalisation; 
(iii) the establishment of new rules to cover intellectual property 
and trade in services; and 
(iv) the interlinkage of all these agreements within the institutional 
framework of the newly established World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
which aims to facilitate the implementation, administration and 
operation of the Uruguay Round agreements subject to an integrated 
dispute settlement mechanism. 11 
All TRIM inconsistent with Articles ill and Xl of GATT 1994 are 
to be notified within 90 days and eliminated within two years, five years, 
and seven years for DC, DGC and least DGC, respectively. There could 
be an extension of the transition period for both DGC and least DGC 
under certain circumstances. 
Similarly TRIP demand that all patentable inventions on 
pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemical products made after entry 
into force of the WTO must be protected. DGC are permitted to delay 
implementation for a further four years, except for the national treatment 
and MFN commitments. Where patent protection is called for in areas 
of technology not currently protected in DGC, a grace period of an 
additional five years is provided in respect of the technologies in 
question. 
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3 
The WTO Agreement consists of a preamble, 16 Articles and four 
Annexes. 1be preamble also recognises the 'need for positive efforts 
designed to ensure that DGC, and especially the least developed among 
them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate 
with the needs of their economic development'. 
DC do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in 
MTN to reduce or remove tariffs and other NTB to the trade of DGC. 
Developed contracting parties 'shall therefore not seek, neither shall 
less developed contracting parties be required to make, concessions that 
are inconsistent with the latters' development, financial and trade needs'. 
The Uruguay Declaration also stipulates that special attention shall be 
given to the particular situation, and problems of the least developed 
countries and to the need to encourage positive measures to facilitate 
the expansion of their trading opportunities. 
At the Marrakesh Ministerial Meeting in 1994 a total of Ill countries 
out of 125 formal participants in the Uruguay Round signed the Final 
Act. The WTO was signed by 104 countries and seven countries 
(Australia, Botswana, Burundi, India, Japan, South Korea and the 
USA) are awaiting their respective national legislative procedures. 
The WTO organisational structure consists of a Ministerial Conference 
and a General Council, which will carry out the functions of a Dispute 
Settlement Body and a Trade Policy Review Body. A Committee 
on Budget, Finance and Administration, a Committee on Trade and 
Development, and a Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions 
will be established by the Ministerial Conference. The Council for 
Trade in Goods, the Council for Trade in Services, and the Council 
for Trade Related Intellectual Property (TRIP) will establish their 
respective rules of procedure subject to the approval of the General 
Council. In general, decisions of the Ministerial Conference and the 
General Council that require a vote will be taken by the majority of the 
votes cast; however, in the case of an interpretation of the WTO 
Agreement or the MTA, the decision will be taken by a three fourths 
majority. 
The Uruguay Round Agreements will address each country's trade, 
environment and sustainable development needs in a balanced and 




All of these benefits are real and important. Every nation now needs 
an effective trading system, but especially so the small and poor. They 
have it. Everyone will also gain from the huge package of market access 
results even if they did not get every concession they were seeking from 
trading partners-it is the biggest market access deal ever negotiated. 
The importance of the Round can be seen in terms of the boost it 
gives to job creation; to development; to investment; to economic 
reform; to the rule of law. 
On the other hand, Caldicott regards URA as the new global 
imperialism: 
The Uruguay Round was designed and planned by some of the world's 
most powerful transnational corporations (TNCs), 70 per cent of which 
are American based, in order to enhance their unimpeded access to 
global resources, cheap labour, and unrestricted markets. The TNCs 
have cleverly managed a new orchestration of the world economy, thus 
introducing a subtle and dangerous form of global imperialism. This 
new imperialism will provoke and legitimise rampant consumerism in 
developed and developing countries, and uncontrolled exploitation of 
the earth's natural resources. It will initiate destruction of trade unions, 
violate environmental laws, destabilise indigenous cultures and 
communities, increase the gap between the world's rich and poor, and 
possibly evoke national and international unrest in a world armed to 
the teeth with nuclear and conventional weapons. 
The truth lies somewhere in between the fantastic optimism of 
Sutherland and emotional outbursts of Caldicott. 
Serious injury was supposed to mean a significant overall impairment 
in the position of a domestic industry. Moreover the concept of 'market 
disruption' was introduced in GAIT in 1960 as legitimising the use of 
discriminatory restrictions against imports from specific countries-
DOC in particular. The acceptance of this concept opened the way for 
the establishment of a discriminatory regime of the MFA against DGC 
exports of textiles and clothing, which has never ceased to expand in 
product and country coverage since the 1960s. Hence the concept of 
'market disruption', a denial of the growing competitiveness of DGC 
in international trade. Further, no compensation would be required for 
actions taken under this concept, unlike the concept of 'serious injury'. 
Article 4 of the Agreement on Safeguards now defines 'serious injury' 
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to mean a significant overall impairment in the position of a domestic 
industry and the determination of the existence of a threat of serious 
injury shall be based on facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture 
or remote possibility. In considering questions of 'market disruption' 
account shall be taken of the interests of the exporting country, especially 
in regard to its stage of development. 
My policy recommendations and conclusions are explained in this 
Section. The so-called 'free-m~ket mechanism' of the existing world 
order of global capitalism does not reflect natural economic Jaws. These 
laws have been made, managed and manipulated by DC since the 
fifteenth century. Also they can be drastically changed without seriously 
affecting the development of global economic relations as a whole. The 
crucial accomplishment of the URA has been to tackle those areas where 
the absence of international consensus had frequently given rise to trade 
disputes and tensions. Hence the most important specifications are to 
be found in the Agreements, more honoured in the breach than in the 
observance, on Safeguards, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 
Anti-dumping, Agriculture, and Textiles and Clothing. Governments of 
the North felt no serious obligation to abide by the rules. Recent trends 
toward protectionism, discrimination, bilateral deals, regional 
arrangements, and cartel-like 'orderly marketing arrangements' were 
obvious and hence greatly damaged GAIT's cornerstone, the most 
favoured nation (MFN) or non-discriminatory principle. This principle 
provided that each GATT member would grant automatically, 
unconditionally and without any compensation, any privileges or 
favour. 
I am not going to argue about the rhetoric of these Agreements. But 
I still have significant doubts about the implementation of these 
Agreements. The most powerful North countries in North America and 
Western Europe will not choose to implement the proposed rules of 
URA in the interests of open, free and fair trade. From the historical 
experiences, even the benefit of the doubt cannot be given to these 
countries that they will abolish their protectionist regimes in the 
immediate future. Developing countries, on the other hand, did not want 
the MTN leading to rules and commitments that would inhibit the 
growth of their infant and still unborn service industries. They thought 
that most North countries would seek concessions and threaten 
retaliation on trade in goods to get their way on rules on trade in services 
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or to force Japan to import more beef from the USA. The aggressive 
pursuit of Japanese markets in this fashion is causing damage to 
Australia; if trade had been liberalised under GAIT, Australia would 
have outcompeted both Japan and the USA. 
Ruggiero has been appointed as the Director-General of WTO. He 
secured the post by defeating two other candidates, South Korean trade 
minister, Chul Su Kim, supported by Asia and Australia; and the former 
Mexican president, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, supported by the USA 
and Canada and Latin America. But given the criticism the USA heaped 
on Ruggiero who was labelled as 'too protectionist' and 'too European', 
and given that good relations between the USA, the EU and Japan are 
important for the smooth functioning ofWTO, the future does not look 
too promising. The global trade system could be facing more 
fragmentation if the major trading nations enter into bilateral or regional 
arrangements and hence fail subsequently to multilateralise the 
implementation of URA as required by the WTO's agreed norms. It 
will be interesting to follow the resolution of the disputation between 
the USA and Japan with respect to the unilateral sanctions imposed by 
the superpower by WTO in coming months. 
The biggest losers of URA will be the least developed among the 
DGC, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, who currently receive 
preferential treatment under schemes such as the Generalised System 
of Preferences (GSP). the Lome Convention, and the Mediterranean 
Agreements. They will have to pay more for their necessary (a) food 
imports which will be more expensive in the absence of subsidies to 
the agricultural sector, (b) medicines and services and (c) technology 
because of the proposed TRIP and TRIM. In the absence of substantial 
foreign aid to these countries, trade liberalisation may not be of much 
benefit to the least DGC. The erosion of preferential margins following 
the URA will reduce the standard of living of the least developed among 
the DGC. The abolition of all special and differential arrangement for 
DGC will not allow the necessary time for diversification of the export 
favours it granted to the products of any member country to like products 
from all other countries. Repeated violations of this principle by some 
North Countries lead many to believe that GAIT cannot be depended 
on to do much good for DGC. 
The URA will establish new MT rules in the fields of agriculture, 
intellectual property and trade in services. It will extend the scope of 
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MT rights and obligations to include such diverse aspects as professional 
qualifications and the movement of persons and electronic data across 
national frontiers, thus making them legitimate subject-matter for 
liidusion in MTA. 
DGC must be prepared to tackle two issues which will be exploited 
by DC in the near future-first, better environment and second, labour 
standards-if they are to avoid future conflicts in trade negotiations. 
Although the GAIT panel ruled that trade restrictions imposed by the 
USA against tuna imports from Mexico contravened GAIT rules, the 
restrictions were defended on the ground that Mexican tuna fishing 
resulted in the killing of more dolphins than allowed under US domestic 
law. Last year trade ministers in Marrakesh agreed to establish a new 
Committee on Trade and the Environment under the WTO. Many 
supports of protectionism in North will keep on arguing that low 
environmental standards in DGC give an 'unfair' advantage in global 
trade-a case of ceo-dumping. I am not sure whether the DGC replies, 
(a) that environmental standards could be achieved through raising 
income through more international trade liberalisation policies and 
(b) that if DC are really interested in maintaining their desired 
environmental standards, the rich countries must increase their aid to 
DGC to reduce the costs of implementing the accepted standards of 
proper environmentally sound policies. These replies are not necessarily 
accepted by DC. 
Trade Unions in the North will be more convinced that low labour 
standards enable DGC to keep labour costs low, thereby conferring 
'unfair' advantage on L'-lem in global trade. The GAIT permitted trade 
restrictions on products made with prison labour, but WTO might extend 
these restrictions to cover the case of 'bonded and child labour' in the 
case of the carpet industry. Following the URA there is at present no 
agreement on the inclusion of labour standards in the future of activities 
ofWTO on account of opposition from many DGC. WTO will get these 
complaints more and more from North. Consequently environment and 
labour standard safeguards issues cannot be ignored by either DGC or 
WTO. 
Finally it is worth noticing that in principle URA introduced greater 
speed and automaticity into dispute settlement procedure under fully 
integrated arrangements. The normal practice of decision making in 
WTO by consensus will continue; with varying voting majorities where 
59 
Debesh Bhattacharya 
consensus cannot be reached. It will be interesting to see how WTO 
will settle the disputation between the remaining superpower, the USA, 
and Japan, with respect to the unilateral imposition of sanctions by the 
superpower when Japan refuses to enter into any bilateral managed 
trade. All the principles of multilateral trade negotiation are on trial by 
the USA and WTO could not start anything worse than the potential 
disaster it will be facing during the first year of its existence. 
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